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BUT IS IT JUST? THE INABILITY FOR CURRENT
ADJUDICATORY STANDARDS TO PROVIDE
“JUST COMPENSATION” FOR CREEPING
EXPROPRIATIONS
Shain Corey*
In hopes of promoting foreign direct investment, the world has
experienced an influx of bilateral investment treaties over the past twenty
years. One protection these treaties afford to foreign investors is the
guarantee of “just compensation” if the host government expropriates their
investment, either directly or indirectly. Extensive jurisprudence exists
discussing how a tribunal determines “just compensation” in cases of
expropriation; however, these methods have historically revolved around
valuing direct expropriations. While tribunals use these same methods to
value indirect expropriations, analysis of these adjudications, particularly
in the cases of a creeping expropriation, result in inconsistent and
unpredictable outcomes.
This Note considers two areas—timing and methodology—that have led
to these inconsistent rulings. The Note first discusses the current
international standards used in these areas and then looks at alternative
methods suggested by scholars to address the resulting inconsistencies. It
concludes by arguing that in cases of creeping expropriations, tribunals
should implement some variation of these alternative methods in order to
produce more consistent outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental economic problem of scarcity is a longstanding issue
that society has tried to address.1 Given the world’s limited resources and
society’s unlimited wants, it is vital to maximize material and human
capital wherever possible.2 Many individuals propose globalization
strategies as a means to address scarcity concerns. One method is to entice
investors to enter a foreign country and use their superior skills and
knowledge to maximize production in a certain sector of the economy.3
This method is particularly beneficial when private actors from developed
countries enter developing countries.4 In the end, developing countries gain
knowledge and skills to produce more efficiently and to better utilize
limited resources.5 In return for bringing knowledge and training into the
country, the foreign investor receives additional profits by increasing its
capital base thanks to new market access.6 Thus, both sides benefit from
this direct foreign investment arrangement, and society puts its scarce
resources to better use.
However, investor uncertainty over entering a country with unfamiliar
laws and practices limits the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that
takes place.7 In addition to encountering foreign business practices and
laws, there is often concern over regulatory uncertainty in a developing
country and the possibility that the foreign government will unfairly take
away the investment from the investor.8 The ability to create an investment
environment that rids the investor of these concerns, therefore, can more
fully promote FDI and the economic benefits it brings.
One effort to create this type of investment environment has been the
mass proliferation of investment treaties between countries.9 While some
of these treaties involve multiple countries, the vast majority have been
bilateral investments treaties (BITs) between two countries.10 There have
been over 2,750 BITs signed between countries, with 2009 seeing more

1. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 20–21 (9th ed. 2004).
2. See id.
3. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 371 (2d ed. 2010).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 372.
6. See id.
7. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1567 (2005).
8. See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Governance 1–2 (Ill. Law and Econ. Working Papers Series, Paper
No. LE06-027, 2006).
9. See Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Damage Valuation of Indirect
Expropriation in International Arbitration Cases, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 447, 447 (2003).
10. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 16–17; see also Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership
and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2971 (2012) (“To encourage foreign
direct investment, governments typically enter into such commitments by signing bilateral
investment treaties providing for international arbitration to resolve disputes.”).
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than one new BIT per week.11 The primary purpose of BITs is to provide
safeguards for the investments of citizens from one country that are located
in the territory of the other country.12 These safeguards include rules
governing the host state’s treatment of the investments and the
establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms.13 The language and
protections of BITs are mostly uniform,14 with one central protection being
the guarantee of compensation in the event of expropriation by the host
This protection encompasses both direct and indirect
country.15
expropriations.16 Direct expropriations have historically been the most
common form of expropriation, where the host government physically takes
control of the asset from the foreign investor.17 However, there has
recently been a large increase in the number of indirect expropriations,
particularly creeping expropriations.18 A creeping expropriation occurs
when the host country institutes a series of acts that, when aggregated, have
the equivalent effect of depriving the owner of any benefit from the
investment while not directly taking the asset from the foreign investor.19
A large amount of case law, particularly arbitration case law, addresses
The consensus under
providing compensation for expropriations.20
11. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2010: Investing in
a Low-Carbon Economy, at 81, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (July 22, 2010) (stating
eighty-two BITs were signed in 2009 with 2,750 signed in total). The United States recently
entered into BITs with Rwanda and Uruguay. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/bit/asset_upload_file743_14523.p
df; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.Uru., Nov. 4, 2005 [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/bit/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf.
12. See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under
Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 47, 52 (2005) (“A BIT is an agreement between two Sovereigns that safeguards
the investments made by investors from each country in businesses or projects located in the
other’s territories.”).
13. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41
HARV. INT’L L.J. 469, 469–70 (2000) (“In general, the agreements protect investment by
investors of one state in the territory of another state by articulating substantive rules
governing the host state’s treatment of the investment and by establishing dispute resolution
mechanisms applicable to alleged violations of those rules.”).
14. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 383.
15. See W. Michael Reisman & Rocio Digon, Eclipse of Expropriation?, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM
PAPERS 27, 27–28 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008).
16. See IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ¶¶ 3.52–.53 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2009).
17. See id. ¶ 3.03; Dictionary of Trade Terms, SICE, http://www.sice.oas.org/dictionary/
IN_e.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
18. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶ 8.02 (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2007).
19. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2,
Arbitral Award, ¶ 17 (June 2, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 214 (2000) (Highet, Arb., dissenting);
W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the
BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 123 (2004).
20. See Reisman & Digon, supra note 15, at 27–28.
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international law arising from these cases is that the host country must
provide “just compensation” to the foreign investor in the event of an
expropriation.21 However, most international legal principles concerned
with how to determine “just compensation” were designed to provide
compensation for direct expropriations.22 While direct expropriations were
at one point in time the primary mode of expropriation, this is rarely the
case today.23 The much more common, contemporary expropriation issue
Unfortunately, the
involves indirect and creeping expropriations.24
principles of international law addressing how to determine “just
compensation” do not easily apply to these forms of expropriation.25
Attempting to apply these principles to creeping expropriation cases has
resulted in several inconsistencies across adjudicatory bodies.26
This Note discusses the difficulties in applying current international law
and BIT standards to determine “just compensation” when a creeping
expropriation occurs. In particular, two issues have led to this problem:
temporal inconsistencies in deciding when to value the investment and
Inconsistent
difficulties in applying typical valuation methods.27
application of the law undermines the purpose of BITs, which is to provide
a structured environment that entices FDI.28 In addition to discussing how
current standards for determining adequate compensation are unsuitable for
creeping expropriations, this Note looks at alternative possibilities for
determining how and when to value the taken asset. Implementation of
these alternative methods may provide more adjudicatory consistency when
determining “just compensation.” Increased consistency would then ideally
result in more effective protection by BITs, increased foreign investment,
and greater global economic development.
Part I of this Note provides a thorough discussion of BITs and the
benefits they provide, with an emphasis on the protection against
expropriations without compensation. It then shifts towards a discussion of
the “just compensation” standard and the ideologies developed around what
satisfies it. Next, Part II discusses the inconsistencies that have arisen by
attempting to apply the current standards for determining “just
compensation” to incidences of creeping expropriation. It first shows the
conflicts that have resulted from the current “moment of expropriation”
standard in determining the point in time in which to value the expropriated
asset. It then discusses the difficulties in applying various accepted
valuation methods to creeping expropriations. Part III considers alternative
strategies that scholars have suggested to address these temporal and
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
712(1)(c) (1987).
22. See infra Part II.A.2, II.B.2.
23. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 8.02.
24. Id.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
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methodological issues. Finally, Part IV asserts the need to implement some
type of change to current practices. It argues that each method proposed in
Part III would help to alleviate some of the inconsistencies that currently
exist, even if they do not completely resolve the problem. Moreover, this
Note proposes alternative solutions that would also provide more
consistency in trying to determine “just compensation” for creeping
expropriations.
I. THE TRENDY TREATY’S COMPENSATION PROTECTION
This Note begins by providing a general background on BITs and the
current international law standards for providing compensation in response
to expropriations. Part I.A explains the history of BITs, their general
structure, and their purpose. Part I.B then discusses expropriations and the
international compensation standards developed in response to them.
Finally, Part I.C concludes by briefly discussing how the nature of
international courts and arbitral tribunals contribute to the question of
determining “just compensation.”
A. The Trendy Treaty: Why BITs Have Become So Popular
This section looks at the history of BITs and discusses reasons for their
recent popularity. It begins by discussing the global prevalence of BITs and
then details the structure and common provisions found in them. Finally,
this section discusses the benefits that BITs offer a country and its citizens,
giving some indication as to why countries enter into these types of treaties.
1. The Global Proliferation of BITs
Though they have existed for over fifty years, mass implementation of
BITs only began in the 1990s. The Federal Republic of Germany and the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan signed the very first BIT in 1959.29 Like this
first BIT, many subsequent agreements were originally signed between a
“developed” country and a “developing” one,30 although it is also common
to have BITs signed between two “developed” or two “developing”
countries.31 Following a boom in the late 1990s and early 2000s, dozens of
29. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 383.
30. See Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 425, 449
(2010) (“BITs were being typically signed between a developed country—the exporter of
capital—and a developing one, so that BIT provisions were mainly placing constraints on the
latter.”); Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655, 656
(1990).
31. See Salacuse, supra note 30, at 658–59. For a list of BITs signed by each country,
see ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublications
RH&actionVal=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter
ICSID List of BITs]; Country-Specific Lists of Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=
2344&lang=1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD List of BITs]. Please note
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countries have signed some form of bilateral investment treaty.32 Many
countries have signed multiple BITs, including the United States (48),
Germany (147), China (128), and Russia (71).33 While the contents and
protections of BITs are mostly uniform, several attempts to make a broad
based multilateral investment treaty between many nations have been
unsuccessful.34 Although some multilateral investment treaties do exist—
the North American Free Trade Agreement35 (NAFTA), for example—the
dominant approach has been to sign bilateral treaties.36
2. The Structure and Protection of BITs
BITs are a popular global investment tool because they provide benefits
to both the host37 state and the foreign investor.38 For the most part, the
protections of BITs are identical,39 and they “tend to resemble each other in
their purpose and content.”40 This is a result of their being derived from a
limited number of common sources.41 The 2012 U.S. Model BIT42 serves
as a good example of a typical BIT because it contains the five substantive
provisions generally found in most BITs: national treatment, most favored
nation status, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and
protection from expropriation without compensation.43
The first provision, national treatment, provides that no signatory to the
BIT may treat a foreign investor less favorably than it would a domestic
investor in like circumstances, or treat a foreign-owned investment less
favorably than a domestically owned investment.44 The most favored
nation provision promises investors from signatory states treatment that is
as good as, or better than, treatment given to investors from nonsignatory
states.45 Countries often combine the next two provisions, fair and
that each organization only lists BITs that governments provide to them, and therefore both
sources must be considered when determining all BITs that a State has entered into.
32. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Investor-State Dispute Settlement and
Impact on Investment Rulemaking, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (Sept. 2007),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf.
33. See ICSID List of BITs, supra note 31; UNCTAD List of BITs, supra note 31.
34. See Edna Sussman, A Multilateral Energy Sector Investment Treaty: Is it Time for a
Call for Adoption by All Nations?, 44 INT’L LAW. 939, 959 (2010).
35. Whereas BITs solely focus on investments, NAFTA is a treaty addressing both
investments and trade.
36. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 16–17.
37. In this Note, the word “host” will refer to the member country of the bilateral
investment treaty that holds the invested asset within its geographical territory.
38. See infra Part I.C.
39. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 383.
40. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 2.05.
41. These sources include BIT drafts produced by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a private group led by Abs and Shawcross in 1959.
See id.
42. U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2012), [hereinafter U.S. MODEL BIT],
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
43. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 2.20.
44. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 3.
45. See, e.g., id. art. 4.
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equitable treatment and full protection and security, into one “minimum
standard of treatment” provision.46 This provision requires member
countries to provide justice in criminal, civil, and administrative
adjudicatory proceedings that satisfies due process, and guarantees the same
degree of police protection and security as is required by international
law.47 The last provision is protection from expropriation without just
compensation.48 This protection covers both direct expropriation of an
individual’s investment, where the State “deprives a private person of his or
her property,”49 and indirect expropriation, which is a more generalized
version of creeping expropriation where a host country incidentally
interferes with the use of property to the point that the interference
significantly deprives the owner of using the investment.50 The forms of
expropriation and the appropriate remedy for expropriatory acts are
discussed in further detail below.51
BITs also provide signatories and investors with several adjudicatory
options.52 Most have some variety of forum clause that allows for
proceedings in national courts or for international arbitration through
neutral organizations such as the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC).53
3. The Reason Countries Enter into BITs
There are several reasons why a country may desire to enter into a BIT
with another country. Not only are there benefits to the country as a
sovereign nation, but the individual citizens of the country also benefit
through their capacity as foreign investors.
a. Benefits to the Host Country
BITs provide numerous benefits to host countries, particularly
developing ones. The primary reason that a country enters into a BIT is the
46. See, e.g., id. art. 5.
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See, e.g., id. art. 6.
49. MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.03.
50. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. Arb(AF)/97/1,
Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 168 (2001) (“[E]xpropriation under NAFTA
includes . . . covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State.”). Although NAFTA is not a BIT, most general principles of BITs, including
principles of expropriation, also apply to NAFTA and other multilateral treaties. See LUKE
ERIC PETERSON, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 22 (2009), http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ihrp/LukePetersonReport.pdf.
51. See infra Part I.B.
52. See Franck, supra note 12, at 54 (“Investors now regularly bring investment claims,
in part because this direct action lets investors choose where they will bring their claims.”).
53. See id.
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hope of attracting increased FDI, which may result in new sources of
capital, new technology from investors, new jobs and training that increase
human capital, and greater access to international markets.54 Increases to
FDI, and subsequent increases in capital assets, allows for free flowing
capital, which improves productivity and accounts for the majority of
economic growth in non-Western countries according to some economic
models.55 Whether BITs do in fact promote additional FDI is beyond the
scope of this Note,56 but a survey conducted by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) showed that investors
rank BITs as an important factor in investment decision making.57 A
country that has entered into BITs is therefore sending a signal to investors
that they offer an investment environment with desirable benefits.58 This
signal may serve as a great advantage to developing countries, which are
continually competing against each other for the investment of developed
nations.59
BITs may also provide positive benefits to the host country’s image. The
protections provided by BITs may represent that investors are getting a
better bargain for an investment that would have occurred anyway.60
Moreover, entering into BITs may portray the country as “modern” because
“BITs became ‘the thing to do’ for developing countries in the 1990s.”61
Additionally, while BITs do limit the legislation a country can implement,
they serve as an incentive to prevent either current governments or future

54. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles
of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with
Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 453 (2008).
55. See Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 478–79 (discussing the Liberal Economic
Model’s predictions of FDI impacts on non-Western countries).
56. Empirical studies have come to conflicting conclusions on this issue. Compare Mary
Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit . . . and They
Could Bite, WORLD BANK’S DEV. RES. GROUP (June 2003), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_0
3091104060047/additional/105505322_20041117160010.pdf (finding minimal impact of
BITs on FDI), and Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and
the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121 (finding a very weak relationship between BITs
and FDI), with Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596704000526 (finding BITs exert a
significant positive effect on outward FDI).
57. See Sussman, supra note 34, at 953 (citing U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., The
Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries, at 51–52, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf).
58. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 19 (“[O]ne might see the BIT as a signal, either to
foreign investors or to domestic audiences, that the government plans to pursue a liberal
economic policy.”).
59. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 490.
60. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 20.
61. Id. at 19.
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regimes from committing actions that break previous promises, making
these promises more credible.62
b. Benefits to Foreign Investors
BITs also provide several benefits to foreign investors. First, they
provide a level of security to enter new markets by alleviating the fear of
unfairly losing one’s investment, particularly in countries where the fear of
expropriation had previously deterred a significant level of investment.63 A
similar benefit is that BITs provide protection from discrimination or unfair
treatment in comparison to domestic investors.64
Third, BIT protections increase the likelihood that investors will maintain
control over their investment.65 FDI is desirable to many investors because
it offers them not only the opportunity for a return on an investment but
also managerial control over that investment.66 Control provides investors
unique opportunities to increase their return by possessing decision-making
authority over matters such as production costs.67 Because of the BIT, an
investor’s control over the asset is protected from injurious actions by the
current government or any future governments.68 In essence, BITs serve as
an insurance policy in the event of unfavorable government actions.69
A fourth benefit that BITs provide to foreign investors is access to courts
and the ability to bring claims against the host country on their own.70
Previously, if an investor had a cause of action against the host country, she
needed to rely on her home government to espouse the claim on her
behalf.71 BITs removed this requirement and allowed the investor to bring
the claim at her own cost.72 Ideally, this allows for more expedient
resolutions and higher quality claims.73
While countries enter into BITs to take advantage of many benefits that
increase the possibility of FDI, benefits from BITs also extend to the
62. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 490–91.
63. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 3.
64. See LUKE ERIC PETERSON, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES—IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND OPTIONS FOR REGULATION 2
(2007), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES
%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf.
65. See Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 473.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 473–76 (discussing two ways that production costs may be reduced
through control).
68. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 11; see also Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 490–91
(arguing that BITs increase the cost of abrogating prior promises to protect foreign
investors).
69. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 465.
70. See PETERSON, supra note 50, at 16; see also Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 2 (stating
BITs offer a novel right that allows “private investors to bring suit against a sovereign
state”).
71. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 1.03.
72. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 11–12.
73. See id.
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citizens of these countries, particularly when they act as foreign investors.
Of the various benefits that BITs provide to investors, the most important
one may be protection against expropriation without compensation. This
Note now provides a deeper look at this topic.
B. The Concern of Expropriation and BIT’s Powers Against It
This section introduces the concept of expropriation and presents how
BITs support the victims of expropriation by guaranteeing compensation.
First, it discusses expropriation in general and then focuses on indirect
expropriation specifically. Next, it explains the “just compensation
standard” prescribed by BITs in response to an expropriation. This section
then provides a history of the two competing ideologies on what this
standard means. Finally, it introduces the practical means of achieving
“just compensation” through asset valuation.
1. Expropriation and Its Many Forms
While the definition of an expropriation tends to vary, the general
concept of expropriation is clear: an expropriation is a governmental taking
of property for which compensation is required.74 However, expropriation
is a broad category in which several different actions may fall.75 As
mentioned previously, the most well-known form of expropriation is a
direct expropriation.76 The concept of a direct expropriation is similar to
eminent domain in the domestic setting.77 The government assuming
control does not automatically mean that it has expropriated the asset,
though. This conclusion is warranted only when “the owner [i]s deprived
of [the] fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation
is not merely ephemeral.”78 Thus, a temporary taking does not necessarily
mean that there was an expropriation.
An asset that is not directly expropriated falls into the category of an
indirect expropriation. This form of expropriation occurs when the host
country takes measures (often through regulatory means) that, while not
taking title of the asset from the foreign investor, typically have an
equivalent effect.79 Essentially, the host country’s actions have rendered
74. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 8.03.
75. See id.
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77. Eminent Domain consists of “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take
privately owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable
compensation for the taking.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009).
78. Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219,
225 (1984).
79. See Catharine Yannaca-Small, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to
Regulate” in International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 43, 46–47 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
11/53/40077899.pdf; cf. PETERSON, supra note 50, at 14 (discussing a growing concern over
how to define “indirect expropriation” so that some regulatory measures that have an impact
on the profitability of an investment are permissible and not deemed expropriations).
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the rights to the investment so useless that the host country is deemed to
have expropriated it.80 In addition to the word “indirect,” the international
investment community also often refers to this form of expropriation as “de
facto,” “disguised,” “constructive,” or that the measures taken are
“tantamount” to an expropriation.81 Joseph Stiglitz provides a fairly
straightforward example of an indirect expropriation that may clarify this
concept:
[E]very country can take actions that decrease the value of an asset—so
much so that they are tantamount to expropriation. For example, an
individual has beachfront property on which he plans to build a house.
The government decides that there is a public good in ensuring that the
beachfront remains pristine, and therefore decides that no house can be
built upon it. However, it leaves the individual as the owner; he can
prevent others from trespassing on his property. But his use of the
property is so circumscribed that the value of the land has been greatly
diminished.82

This example portrays how a single act by the host country can make an
asset valueless to the owner despite retaining legal title to the asset.
Since many governmental actions have a positive net social benefit
despite hurting some parties, it is unclear what constitutes an indirect
expropriation versus a legitimate government action. The United States, as
shown in the United States-Uruguay BIT, declares that determining whether
an action constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, factbased inquiry.83 Some factors to consider include the economic impact of
the government action, the degree to which the action interferes with
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action.84
While any indirect expropriation is troublesome, a more problematic
form is a creeping expropriation. A creeping expropriation is a specific
type of indirect expropriation where a series of acts deprive the investor of
her investment only when the effects of those acts are aggregated.85 If one
or two events in the series can be determined as the factors that destroyed
the investment’s value, then it may be misleading to deem this a “creeping
expropriation.”86 The tribunal in Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic87
reiterated this concept when it stated:
80. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Taking of Property, at 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (Jan. 2000), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd15.en.pdf
(“Certain governmental measures may not involve an actual physical taking of property, but
may still result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant
depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign investor.”); G.C. Christie, What
Constitutes a Taking Under International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 307, 311 (1962).
81. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.51; Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 47.
82. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 513.
83. See U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 11, Annex B.
84. See id.
85. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 123.
86. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 114 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004); Compañia
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By definition, creeping expropriation refers to a process, to steps that
eventually have the effect of an expropriation. If the process stops before
it reaches that point, then expropriation would not occur. This does not
necessarily mean that no adverse effects would have occurred.
Obviously, each step must have an adverse effect but by itself may not be
significant or considered an illegal act. The last step in a creeping
expropriation that tilts the balance is similar to the straw that breaks the
camel’s back. The preceding straws may not have had a perceptible effect
but are part of the process that led to the break.88

For example, consider an individual who owns a rubber plant in a foreign
country. The plant is operating profitably, but then the foreign government
institutes several policy measures that affect all economic activity. The first
measure reduces the number of hours an employee may legally work per
week to thirty-eight hours and overtime is no longer permitted. As a result,
the plant owner must reduce total hours of production. Several months
later, a second policy measure puts a cap on plant emissions, which forces
the owner to reduce the quantity of rubber produced. A year later, the State
then requires the owner to increase the social security contributions it
makes for its employees, further reducing revenues. Each measure on its
own is not enough to significantly harm the plant owner, but when all three
are combined it is no longer profitable to continue operating the rubber
plant. Thus, while the individual owner is still in physical possession of the
facility, the various policy measures made the investment worthless.
Policy makers may argue that such measures are necessary to protect the
public interest; however, one can see the potential grounds to argue that a
creeping expropriation has occurred. Because creeping expropriations are
distinct in that they occur gradually over time, they cause unique
adjudicatory problems given the current state of international law,
particularly in the realm of valuation and the related issue of timing.89
Moreover, while direct expropriations have become rather rare in recent
years, international courts and tribunals are beginning to see a higher
prevalence of indirect expropriation claims.90
Whether dealing with direct or indirect expropriation, it is important to
note that governmental intent is less important than the effects of the act on

del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1,
Final Award, ¶ 76 (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169 (2000); Reisman & Sloane, supra
note 19, at 123.
87. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, (Feb. 2007).
88. Id. ¶ 263.
89. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 125–27; infra Part II.
90. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.51; cf. Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs: An
Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ONLINE 149 (2012) (arguing for the use of arbitration panels in patent disputes
because the issuance of some compulsory patent licenses could constitute an indirect
expropriation).
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the foreign investor.91 International law requires compensation for the act
when the host state interferes with the use of an investment or deprives the
owner of the fundamental rights of ownership, no matter if it intended this
result or not.92 As this Note shall now explain, BITs explicitly state this
international law requirement.
2. The Guarantee of Compensation for Expropriation
One of the common BIT safeguards is protection from expropriation
without compensation.93 BITs typically include this protection as its own
provision, as seen in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT.94 Article 6(1) of this
document states:
Article 6: Expropriation and Compensation
1. Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation
or nationalization (“expropriation”), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum
Standard of Treatment](1) through (3).95

The above passage makes three points. First, expropriations are lawful as
long as four elements are satisfied.96 In general, BITs and customary
international law do not prohibit countries from expropriating foreign
investments as long as the taking occurred for a public purpose, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law, and
compensation was provided.97 The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States also recognizes the lawfulness of expropriations as
long as these elements are satisfied.98
91. See Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
219, 225–26 (1986); Christie, supra note 80, at 311 (“[A] State may expropriate property,
where it interferes with it, even though the State expressly disclaims any such intention.”).
92. See Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 225.
93. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
94. U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42.
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id.
97. See REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY FRAMEWORK
REVIEW: GOVERNMENT POSITION PAPER 40 (2009), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/
files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf; see also MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.05
(discussing the role of compensation as one of the four elements that makes an expropriation
lawful versus unlawful); Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 45.
98. Section 712 of the Restatement asserts: “A state is responsible under international
law for injury resulting from: (1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of
another state that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not
accompanied by provision for just compensation . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712(1) (1987).
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Next, the Model BIT states that this rule requiring all four elements be
satisfied for a lawful expropriation applies to both direct and indirect
expropriations.99 Because of this standard, it is generally viewed that most
indirect or creeping expropriations have to be considered unlawful.100 By
the very nature of indirect expropriations, though, one of the four elements
is usually missing, typically the accompaniment of compensation or due
process of law elements.101 It is unsettled, however, whether tribunals
should alter damages awards based on if the asset was lawfully or
unlawfully expropriated.102
Additionally, while BITs explicitly state that they protect against
uncompensated indirect expropriations, they typically provide only general
definitions of what is an expropriation, making it difficult for adjudicators
to determine when a legal act has occurred versus an illegal
expropriation.103 Some countries state that governmental acts designed to
address legitimate public welfare concerns, such as health, safety, land
reform, and environmental issues, do not constitute expropriations either
directly or indirectly.104 However, if there is evidence that the government
implemented these policies in bad faith or on a discriminatory basis then a
court or tribunal may nonetheless find an expropriation.105 The issue over
when an act crosses the line and becomes expropriatory, especially in the
context of indirect expropriation, continues to be a lively and heavily
contested debate that is beyond the scope of this Note.106
A third important point shown in both the U.S. Model BIT and the
Restatement is that a host country is required to provide “just

99. U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 6; accord MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.53.
100. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.54.
101. See Sedco, Inc. v Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 206 n.42
(1986) (Brower, Arb., concurring) (“By definition it is difficult to envision a de facto or
‘creeping’ expropriation ever being lawful, for the absence of a declared intention to
expropriate almost certainly implies that no contemporaneous provision for compensation
has been made. Indeed, research reveals no international precedent finding such an
expropriation to have been lawful.”).
102. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.75–.77; SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS,
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 65–69 (2008); cf. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra
note 18, ¶ 9.67.
103. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 8.03.
104. See CANADA MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY annex B.13(1)(c) (2004),
[hereinafter CANADIAN MODEL BIT], available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian
2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf; U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, annex B; LUKE ERIC PETERSON,
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, SOUTH AFRICA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (2006), http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf (stating that governments often argue that BIT
provisions on expropriation must not prejudice a government’s power to regulate the
economy in a good-faith and nondiscriminatory manner).
105. See CANADIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 104, annex B.13(1)(c).
106. For a brief introduction to this debate see, for example, Michael G. Parisi, Moving
Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in International Law, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2005); Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 43–72.
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compensation” in response to an expropriation.107 The policy behind this
rule is sensible because without compensation an expropriation acts as a
nonvoluntary transfer of resources from a private owner to the public, and
the possibility of this occurring with no recourse creates a disincentive to
invest.108
However, what satisfies “just compensation?” This question essentially
breaks down into two different inquiries: (1) What is the proper standard
of compensation; and (2) What is the proper method of compensation?109
While the next section discusses the state of the law regarding the first
question, the answer to the second question is unclear as it pertains to
creeping expropriation. Parts II, III, and IV address this second question in
detail.
3. The Principle of Full Compensation and
Competing Ideologies to Satisfy It
The first step to conclude what satisfies “just compensation” requires
determining the proper standard of compensation. Case law has served as
an initial guide in answering this question, but efforts to further refine the
case law saw the emergence of two competing ideologies—the Hull
Formula and Calvo Doctrine—that jockeyed for global acceptance for much
of the twentieth century.
a. The Full Compensation Principle
International law provides a starting point to determine the appropriate
standard to provide “just compensation.” International law holds that the
proper standard for compensation must be to put the investor in the position
he would have been in but for the expropriatory event.110 The Factory at
Chorzów111 (Chorzów Factory) initially laid out this rule, which holds that
“reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.”112 The Tribunal in Amoco
107. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
108. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 9.
109. See Peter C. Choharis, U.S. Courts and the International Law of Expropriation:
Toward a New Model For Breach of Contract, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 36 (2006) (“Only a few
U.S. courts have even considered the issue of the amount of compensation necessary to
negate a finding of expropriation, and when they have, they overwhelmingly focused on the
standard of compensation. McKesson is one of the few cases actually to calculate damages
. . . .”).
110. See Am. Mfg. & Trading v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.21 (Feb.
1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 14 (2002) (“[The question] is how the Tribunal should proceed to
assess the amount of compensation or indemnification required by international law in order
to restore to AMT the conditions previously existing as if the events had never occurred or
taken place.”).
111. (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
112. Id. at 47.
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International Finance v. Iran113 noted that this principle is still the reigning
law despite the case being almost sixty years old.114 Therefore, under
international law, a country provides “just compensation” when the
Chorzów Factory standard of full compensation is satisfied.
b. Competing Compensation Standards: The Hull and Calvo Ideologies
While the general consensus is that the Chorzów Factory standard must
be satisfied to provide “just compensation,” there are two competing
ideologies as to what level of compensation meets this standard. These
ideologies are identified as the Hull Formula and the Calvo Doctrine,
respectively.115 The Hull Formula is considered a pro-investor standard
whereas the Calvo Doctrine is a pro-host state or pro-developing country
standard.116
The Hull Formula stems from disputes between the United States and
Mexico over expropriation of U.S.-owned agricultural property and oil
fields following the Mexican Revolution of 1910–1920.117 It was in the
context of these expropriations that U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull
argued that countries that expropriate property are required to provide just
compensation that is “prompt, adequate and effective.”118 Many BITs,
particularly German and American treaties have elaborated on the meaning
of these adjectives.119 “Prompt” tends to mean that interest shall accrue
from the date of expropriation and is included in any agreement or award of
compensation.120 “Adequate” is usually defined as the “fair market value”
or “market value” before the expropriation occurred, and excludes any
changes in value resulting from knowledge of the expropriation before it
occurred.121 Lastly, “effective” means that the compensation must be in a
medium that is freely usable or convertible by the investor.122 The

113. 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987).
114. See id. ¶ 191 (“In spite of the fact that it is nearly sixty years old, [Chorzów Factory]
is widely regarded as the most authoritative exposition of the principles applicable in this
field, and is still valid today.”).
115. See Vicki L. Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings”
Doctrine 15–16 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-02-06, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=337480.
116. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 5–6.
117. See Hilary Heilbron, Assessing Damages in International Arbitration: Practical
Considerations, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
445, 458 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2d ed. 2008); Tali Levy, NAFTA’s
Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A Reassessment of the “Prompt,
Adequate and Effective” Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 423, 424–29 (1995) (providing a
detailed history of Hull’s communications with Mexico over this issue).
118. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 6.
119. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 386.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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definition of “prompt, adequate, and effective” favors developed countries
since they are more likely to export capital than import it.123
Capital importing countries, typically developing ones, attempted to
dispute the Hull Formula as the proper standard for just compensation under
international law.124 Carlos Calvo, an Argentine jurist, formulated the
standard that these states desired.125 Calvo argued that international law
only requires countries to give aliens rights that are equal to those given to
Therefore, the proper standard for compensating
its citizens.126
expropriation is merely the equivalent of national treatment,127 which may
warrant a lower level of compensation than the Hull Formula requires.
While developed countries supported the Hull Formula, most developing
nations supported the Calvo Doctrine, and through resolutions in the 1960s
and 1970s, the United Nations chose to side with Calvo.128 In 1962, the
U.N. General Assembly adopted the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources,129 which allowed for nationalization of foreignowned property as long as the nationalizing country provided “appropriate
compensation.”130 This standard was an attempt to find middle ground
between developed and developing countries,131 because the ambiguity
provided by the word “appropriate” allowed for some to argue that less than
full compensation was permitted under certain circumstances.132 However,
the Hull Formula was rejected outright in 1974 when the General Assembly
adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.133 Article
2(c) of this resolution maintained the “appropriate compensation” standard
but went on to state that “[i]n any case where the question of compensation
gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals.”134 This resolution therefore
explicitly adopted Calvo’s national treatment standard over Hull’s standard.
Hull proponents did not take this defeat lying down, though. Six
developed countries, including the United States, rejected Article 2.135
Moreover, during this same period developed countries began signing BITs

123. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 6.
124. See Kaj Hober, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: Recent Cases on
Expropriation, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 377, 386 (2003).
125. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 115, at 15–16.
126. See id. at 15.
127. See id.
128. See Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 44 n.1.
129. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/193/11/PDF/NR019311.pdf?OpenElement.
130. Id. at 15.
131. Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 44 n.1.
132. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 73.
133. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9946
(Dec. 12, 1974), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/
738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement; see Yannaca-Small, supra note 79, at 44 n.1.
134. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 133, at 52.
135. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 115, at 16.
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with developing countries.136 They used this opportunity as a means to
reinstill the Hull Formula, and by the 1980s most countries had converged
on a single model for BITs containing Hull’s “prompt, adequate, and
effective” language.137
c. The Current Prowess of Hull and the Lingering of Calvo
It is understandable why the consensus amongst BITs is to embrace the
Hull Formula. Given that the primary purpose of BITs is to promote
foreign investment, it is reasonable to adopt the compensation standard that
best achieves this end by favoring investors.138 Moreover, capitalexporting states drove the movement to enter BITs, and they
understandably sought to have the language of these treaties be in terms
most favorable to their citizens.139 These countries thus utilized BITs as a
means to provide their citizens with stronger protections than international
law was willing to recognize through the Calvo Doctrine.140
The mass proliferation of BITs utilizing the Hull Formula has caused
some commentators to declare the Calvo Doctrine, and therefore the debate
over the proper standard to determine just compensation, dead.141 In
addition to the BITs signed by developed countries, several BITs between
Latin American countries (the strongest proponents of the Calvo Doctrine)
and between other developing countries embrace the Hull Formula.142
Examples include the BIT between Argentina and El Salvador,143 between
Ethiopia and Sudan,144 and between the Russian Federation and Turkey.145
However, there is evidence of continued use of Calvo’s national
treatment standard, indicating that the debate is not yet over.146 First, it is
argued that the national treatment ideology is visible in several Latin
American countries based on constitutional interpretations of BITs and
legislative measures taken in response to them.147 Second, advocates argue
136. See id. at 17; Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 8.
137. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 8.
138. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 9.09.
139. See Salacuse, supra note 30, at 661.
140. See Levy, supra note 117, at 437.
141. See Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Private-Public Debate”:
Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law,
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 631, 631 n.1 (2007).
142. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.16.
143. Agreement Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Arg.-El Sal., art. 7, May 9, 1996, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/argen_elsalvador_sp.pdf.
144. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, Eth.-Sudan,
art. 4, Mar. 7, 2000, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ethiopia_
sudan.pdf.
145. Agreement Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Russ.-Turk., art. 6, Dec. 15, 1997, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/russia_turkey.pdf.
146. See Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 141–42 (2007).
147. See generally Shan, supra note 141, at 631.
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that a lower standard for “just compensation,” at least in terms of indirect
expropriation, may be appropriate.148 Joseph Stiglitz argues that a country
should be permitted to pass regulations that it believes in good faith will
improve economic efficiency even if there are ancillary effects on income
distribution.149 The requirement to compensate those who are adversely
affected may incentivize the country not to implement these regulations at
the expense of economic efficiency or to the detriment of its citizenry as a
whole (such as environmental regulations that lead to indirect
expropriations).150 Irmgard Marboe similarly points out that use of the Hull
formula may limit a country’s sovereign right to regulate the use of
property with regard to environmental or social standards.151 If tribunals
deem a country’s regulations to cause indirect expropriations then the
country may face high financial burdens through large damages awards.152
Such high compensation awards can pose a problem for relatively small
countries,153 and the inability for countries to meet this burden may warrant
a standard below the Hull Formula when providing compensation.154
4. Achieving “Just Compensation” by Determining the Asset’s Value
As discussed above, despite the continued debate between the Hull
Formula and Calvo Doctrine, the vast majority of BITs explicitly state
Hull’s “prompt, adequate, and effective” standard as the appropriate
benchmark for providing just compensation.155 In addition to this language,
most BITs provide further guidance and state that the amount of
compensation is determined through the notion of asset valuation.156
Though various terms are used, the majority of BITs state that proper value
is given by providing “fair market value.”157 Many other BITs use terms
148. See, e.g., MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.11–.13; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 324 (1991); Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 514–15.
149. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 514–15 (arguing that BITs intrude on the rights of a
country to self-governance).
150. See id. (providing theoretical reasons for why a country should be able to adopt
regulations without compensating those adversely affected).
151. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.11–.13.
152. See id. ¶ 3.13.
153. See id. ¶ 3.12. (citing CME Czech BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Final
Award on Damages, (Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 264 (2006) (separate opinion of
Arbitrator Brownlie)).
154. See SCHACHTER, supra note 148, at 324 (stating that the standard for “appropriate”
or “just” compensation leaves considerable latitude to an arbiter or the parties in negotiation,
and that some governments maintain that it would not be inappropriate or unjust to reduce
the amount of compensation in some circumstances).
155. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
156. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 79.
157. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 9.12; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note
102, at 79; see also, e.g., U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 11; Agreement on the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, S. Kor.-S. Afr., art. 5, July 7, 1995, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_southafrica.pdf; Treaty Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. 4(1), Nov. 14,
1991 [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf.
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such as “market value,” “actual value,” “genuine value,” and “just value,”
but these are generally seen as equivalents of each other.158 International
law also recognizes fair market value as the common valuation standard to
provide “just compensation.”159 In Vivendi v. Argentina,160 the tribunal
found “fair market value” to be equivalent to the applicable BIT’s term of
“actual value.”161 Similarly, the tribunal in McKesson Corp. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran162 held that proper compensation is “full value,” which is
usually the “fair market value.”163 Additionally, the Restatement affirms
these opinions, stating that “there must be payment for the full value of the
property, usually ‘fair market value’ where that can be determined.”164
While the consensus finds that “just compensation” is met by providing
the fair market value, there is limited authority that customary international
law allows for less than market value in some circumstances.165 For
example, Professor Oscar Schachter argues that for BITs which do not use
the term “fair market value,” but simply refer to “just” or “equitable”
compensation, a large-scale expropriation such as land reform or
environmental regulations might allow for less than market value
compensation to prevent overly burdening the host country.166
In summary, international law and investment treaty law generally
conclude that a tribunal has awarded “just compensation” when the
Chorzów Factory standard (i.e., providing full compensation that wipes out
all consequences of an illegal act) is satisfied.167 While there are competing
ideologies as to the level of compensation needed to meet this standard, the
leading view found in the majority of BITs is Hull’s “prompt, adequate, and
effective” standard.168 Moreover, the practical means of determining an

158. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 386; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note
102, at 183; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 675 (defining fair market
value).
159. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 79; see also, e.g., SEDCO, Inc. v.
Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 193 (1986) (Brower, Arb.,
concurring); INA Corp. v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 378–79 (1985).
160. Compañía de Aguas Del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi v.
Argentina), ICSID Case No. Arb/97/3, Award (Aug. 20, 2007).
161. See id. ¶ 8.2.10.
162. 116 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part sub nom. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated in part, 320 F.3d 280
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
163. See id. at 36.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
cmt. (d) (1987).
165. See LUKE ERIC PETERSON & ROSS GARLAND, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES AND LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 13 (2010), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1001485.
166. See SCHACHTER, supra note 148 at 324.
167. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 116–54 and accompanying text.
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appropriate value calls for a valuation method that determines the fair
market value of the asset.169
C. The Role of Arbitral Tribunals and International Courts
Having discussed the proper standard to determine “just compensation”
under international law, this Note now addresses the question of what is the
proper method for determining “just compensation” with respect to
creeping expropriation. Yet, before discussing this issue in Parts II–IV, it is
worth briefly considering the role the adjudicatory process has played in
complicating what constitutes “just compensation” for creeping
expropriation.
It is generally accepted that expropriation of a foreign investor’s asset “is
a matter of international law and not of national law.”170 Therefore,
expropriation claimants can bring their claims in several different forums
depending on the language of the relevant BIT.171 Such forums include
national courts, international courts, and more commonly one of several
international arbitration arenas.172 These diverse forums have led to
adjudicators reaching different results under nearly identical textual treaty
rights.173
Part of this problem is a result of the arbitral adjudication process.174
Tribunals commonly hold arbitrations behind closed doors, the resolution
(and often the dispute itself) is kept secret, appeals are limited, and many
decisions are not published.175 While investor-state arbitrations have been
publicized much more than other types of arbitrations, providing a greater
amount of precedent available for tribunals to consider,176 there are still a
rather minute number of published decisions dealing with creeping
expropriation. Additionally, only a small portion of these cases even
discusses how to determine the appropriate remedy when a creeping
expropriation has occurred. Lastly, arbitration does not follow the doctrine
of stare decisis,177 meaning that all tribunal decisions are nonbinding
169. See supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text. This Note discusses the numerous
valuation methods used in practice in Part II.B.1, below, although as Part II.B.2 discusses,
these are not necessarily the most appropriate methods.
170. MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.04.
171. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Rutledge, supra note 90, at 161
(“Over the last two decades, the number of BIT arbitrations has skyrocketed. Indirect
expropriation claims have become an increasingly popular theory to advance in such
arbitrations.”).
173. See Franck, supra note 12, at 55–56.
174. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 540–41 (arguing that the dispute resolution process for
arbitral tribunals falls short of the “best practices” found in the legal systems of Western
democracies).
175. See Rutledge, supra note 90, at 161–62; Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 541.
176. See Franck, supra note 12, at 74 & nn.105–06 (“[I]nvestment treaty arbitration has
no fewer than three websites, a new Westlaw database dedicated to publishing awards and
organizations dedicated to obtaining and distributing information about awards.”).
177. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1895, 1908 (2010).
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anyway.178 Each of these factors makes it difficult to build upon any form
of precedent or resolve contradicting decisions.179 Additionally, arbitrators
typically resort to expert opinions in valuing damages, but are not obligated
to rely on any particular view or opinion.180 Rather, the tribunal can make
the award based on its own understanding of the different valuations
presented.181
Other adjudicatory issues arise from problems inherent in BITs and the
issue of creeping expropriation, which is what Part II of this Note examines.
BITs invoke ambiguous terms182 that, coupled with no doctrine of stare
decisis and a lack of published decisions, allow different arbitration panels
to reach opposite, yet binding, conclusions.183 Similarly, reaching
agreement as to whether a series of events has resulted in an indirect
expropriation giving rise to state responsibility (let alone at what moment in
time the taking officially occurs) is a difficult decision that has resulted in
adjudicatory discrepancies.184 These problems may be part of the reason
why there is inconsistency in successfully determining what equates to “just
compensation” in situations of creeping expropriation. Part II discusses
such inconsistencies and explains how they arose through difficulties in
applying current standards to creeping expropriations.
II. FITTING A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE: APPLYING CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS TO CREEPING EXPROPRIATIONS AND ITS
INCONSISTENCIES IN PROVIDING JUST COMPENSATION
Most BITs state that providing “just compensation” is achieved upon
awarding the fair market value of the asset. Part II examines the difficulties
that have arisen in trying to properly accomplish this task in cases of
creeping expropriation. These difficulties have arisen for two reasons. Part
II.A considers the first, which is the difficulty of determining a moment in
time to value the asset. Part II.B then considers the problems surrounding
the use of various valuation formulas when calculating fair market value.
A. Temporal Inconsistencies in Determining When to Value the Investment
This section focuses on temporal issues that have arisen in cases trying to
determine the moment at which a creeping expropriation happens. It begins
by discussing international law’s current “moment of expropriation”
178. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 1537 (“The doctrine of precedent,
under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again
in litigation.”).
179. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 541.
180. See Abdala & Spiller, supra note 9, at 448.
181. See id.
182. This Note’s effort to discern and clarify the ambiguous term “just compensation”
serves as an immediate example of this problem.
183. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 541.
184. See Burns H. Weston, “Constructive Takings” Under International Law: A Modest
Foray into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation,” 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 103, 105–06
(1975).
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standard to determine the time an asset is valued and then discusses the
inconsistent results that have occurred when trying to apply this standard to
creeping expropriations.
1. The “Moment of Expropriation” as the Current Timing Standard
In order to provide an appropriate remedy, a trier of fact must determine
the value of the expropriated asset. Otherwise, the tribunal will be unable
to tell the actual value the foreign investor has lost. A key component to
the valuation process is the moment in time in which to determine the
asset’s value.185 There are several reasons why the valuation date is
significant. First, an asset’s value fluctuates constantly over time.186 Value
changes as new information becomes available, whether the information is
systematic or idiosyncratic, and investors price in this new information.187
Second, valuation methods ignore all changes to the investment’s value
subsequent to the valuation date.188 Third, for investments with a limited
life span, adjusting the date of valuation alters the remaining profitable life
the investment has.189 Thus, the date chosen to value the asset may have
large ramifications on the size of the investor’s award.190
Under current standards, valuation is done at the “moment of
expropriation.”191 The language of most BITs considers the moment of
expropriation as the point in time immediately before the expropriation took
place.192 International law also supports this view, which the tribunal in
Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica193
expressed by stating that “[t]he expropriated property is to be evaluated as
of the date on which the governmental ‘interference’ has deprived the
owner of his rights or has made those rights practically useless.”194 The
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law also supports this proposition.195
The World Bank guidelines on the treatment of FDI196 offers further
support by stating that “[c]ompensation will be deemed ‘adequate’ if it is
185. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.250.
186. See id.
187. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 243.
188. See id. (using Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28 2007), as an example).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 128.
192. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 6(2)(b) (“[Compensation shall] be
equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriation took place . . . .”); CANADIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 104, art. 13(2) (“Such
compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place . . . .”).
193. ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169 (2000).
194. Id. ¶ 78.
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
cmt. (d) (1987).
196. 2 WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
REPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT (1992), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS
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based on the fair market value of the taken asset as such value is determined
immediately before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to
take the asset became publicly known.”197 This quote also states the one
exception to this rule under some treaties, which is that if knowledge of the
expropriation was public prior to the act of expropriation, then the moment
of valuation is the time immediately before the decision to take the asset
became known publicly.198 Historically, the “moment of expropriation”
rule has made sense because it seems obvious that the valuation date for an
expropriation should be the moment that the expropriation occurs and the
investor’s asset is lost.199
However, choosing a specific moment of expropriation is not easily
applied to situations of creeping expropriation, where the deprivation does
not occur at one particular instant.200 Because creeping expropriation
involves a series of acts or omissions that only deprive the investor of his
asset when aggregated, the exact moment of expropriation will rarely be
identifiable.201
W. Michael Reisman and Robert D. Sloane explain that an unclear
moment of expropriation can lead to a windfall for either the investor or the
host country depending on when the tribunal decides that the moment of
expropriation occurred.202 If a tribunal selects a moment of expropriation
earlier on in the series of acts, then the investor may receive a windfall.203
An earlier date may cause the tribunal to assess the asset prior to some acts
that reduced the value, but were nonetheless lawful.204 Here, the investor
will receive compensation from the host state for lost value resulting from
acts outside those deemed expropriatory. To better understand this point it
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/11/10/000094946_99090805303082/Rendered/PDF/multi_pa
ge.pdf.
197. Id. art. IV(3) (emphasis added).
198. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 157, art. 4 (“Compensation shall be equivalent
to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory
action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier . . . .”); see also Treaty Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Russ., art. 3(1),
June 17, 1992, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usa_russia.pdf
(“Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or became known . . . .”); Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Pan., art. 5(1), Oct. 7, 1983, available
at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_panama.pdf (“[C]ompensation shall
amount to the fair value which the investment expropriated had immediately before the
expropriation became known.”); 2 WORLD BANK, supra note 196, art. IV(3) (“Compensation
will be deemed ‘adequate’ if it is based on the fair market value of the taken asset as such
value is determined immediately before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision
to take the asset became publicly known.”). But see U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 42, art. 6(2)
(“The compensation referred to in paragraph 1(c) shall . . . not reflect any change in value
occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier . . . .”).
199. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.253.
200. See id. ¶ 3.278.
201. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 133.
202. See id. at 144.
203. See id.
204. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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is important to remember that many legal regulatory acts can reduce an
asset’s worth without obligating the state to provide compensation, such as
a daily emissions cap that causes a reduction in overall output.
Using similar logic, one sees that a later expropriation date may provide a
windfall to the host country. Because the initial acts of the expropriatory
series gradually reduce the property’s value,205 the state gets away with not
paying for some of the effect that its expropriatory acts had on the asset. In
both scenarios, one of the parties receives a windfall from the creeping
expropriation, which undermines the purpose of providing for protections
against expropriations in the first place.206
Therefore, in matters of creeping expropriation, the point in time that the
tribunal selects as the “moment of expropriation” can have large
ramifications on the award given. Indeed, the court in SEDCO Inc. v.
National Iranian Oil Co.207 recognized this fact and the importance of
determining a proper moment of expropriation since, “the value of the
shareholders’ expropriated interest may change dramatically during the
surrounding time.”208
Another consideration that adds to this issue is that many investors will
incur additional expenses trying to rescue or fortify an investment that has
been hindered by a regulatory act that, unbeknownst to the investor at the
time, is the beginning of an expropriation.209 In response to an injurious
government action, many investors rationally use additional capital to
support the investment.210 This is particularly the case in situations where
government officials provide assurances that further acts are unlikely to
occur.211
One may argue that using additional capital in response to an initial
injurious act, with the possibility of further acts to come, is simply a
business risk that investors assume. However, one might also argue that
compensatory awards for the expropriation should consider these additional
costs. Otherwise, the incentive is for individuals to limit their capital
investment since attempting to keep it afloat only further hurts the
investor’s chances of receiving a full recovery down the line.212

205. Cf. Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 144 (discussing how some investors attempt
to rescue their investment because an initial act has hindered the investment but not made it
entirely valueless).
206. See id. (stating that the goal of BITs would be ill-served by a policy that rewards
creeping expropriations).
207. 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248 (1985).
208. Id. at 278.
209. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 144.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Vance R. Koven, Expropriation and the ‘Jurisprudence’ of OPIC, 22 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 269, 277 (1981) (“Since it is the value of the foreign enterprise at the date of
expropriation that is compensable, the more stoically the foreign enterprise hangs on in the
face of host government interference, the more it hurts its chances of recovering the full
value of its business.”).
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2. Cases Addressing the Temporal Issue
Several creeping expropriation cases evidence the difficulty in choosing a
specific “moment of expropriation” when considering their inconsistent
conclusions. Some tribunals decide that the moment of expropriation
occurs near the beginning of the expropriatory acts. In SEDCO, the U.S.Iran Claims Tribunal concluded that the “moment of expropriation” was an
act earlier on in the process of depriving SEDCO of its investment.213
SEDCO owned 50 percent of a joint venture called Sediran to operate land
drilling rigs in Iran.214 Sediran had multiple contracts with the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC);215 however, disagreements between the
NIOC and SEDCO led the NIOC to deny SEDCO access to Sediran’s funds
in the fall of 1979.216 In November of 1979, Iran then appointed its own
temporary directors to replace the current Sediran directors.217 Nine
months later, Iran took full control of Sediran under the Protection and
Development of Iranian Industries Act.218
Despite SEDCO not losing full control of the company until this final act,
the tribunal found that the second act of inserting temporary managers was
the moment of expropriation and must serve as the date of valuation. The
tribunal concluded, “When, as in the instant case, the seizure of control by
appointment of ‘temporary’ managers clearly ripens into an outright taking
of title, the date of appointment presumptively should be regarded as the
date of taking.”219
The tribunal in Amoco also found the moment of expropriation to be
earlier on in the process.220 In this instance, Amoco entered into a joint
venture with the National Petrochemical Company (NPC), an Iranian
subsidiary of NIOC, to explore offshore oil fields.221 The joint company
was named Khemco.222 Due to the turbulent political climate from the
Iranian Revolution, NPC publicly announced that it would try to buy out
Amoco in April 1979.223 One month later the NPC chairman stated that
Amoco expatriates who had previously left the country for safety were no
longer permitted to return, and in June he stated that NPC would manage
the sale of all products.224 NPC then unilaterally took over the operations
213. See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248 (1985).
214. See id. at 259–60.
215. See id. at 266.
216. See id. at 276–77.
217. See id. at 277.
218. See id. at 264–65.
219. Id. at 278; cf. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 122, 154 (1983) (“There can be little doubt that at least at the end of January 1980 the
Claimants had been deprived of the effective use, control and benefits of their property rights
. . . [b]y that time the Ministry of Housing had appointed [a] Temporary Manager . . . .”).
220. See Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987).
221. See id. ¶¶ 28–29.
222. See id.
223. See id. ¶¶ 52–57.
224. See id. ¶ 61.
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of Khemco in July of 1979.225 Similar to the outcome in SEDCO, the
Iranian government directly expropriated Khemco on January 8, 1980.226
The tribunal concluded, however, that this was not a case of a direct
expropriation despite the Iranian government’s actions.227 Rather, the
expropriation was a process that “officially” occurred when NPC took over
the operations of Khemco in July 1979.228 In reaching this date, the
tribunal stated that “the date to be considered for the valuation of such
compensation will be the date at which measures definitively took effect,
rather than the date of the final decision of nationalization.”229 In both of
these instances, the tribunal chose the “moment of expropriation” to be
earlier in the series of actions.
The ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts230 also supports the view of placing the “moment of expropriation” as
the first incident in the series. Article 15(1) of this treaty states that “[t]he
breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions
or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or
omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is
sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.”231 The Article then goes on to
state that “[i]n such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting
with the first of the actions or omissions of the series.”232 Therefore, when
a wrongful deprivation takes place through a series of acts, Article 15(1)
may consider the expropriation to be when the first act occurs.
Conversely, there are other tribunal decisions that chose the moment of
expropriation to be near the end of the regulatory acts. The tribunal in
International Technical Products v. Iran233 made such a decision. In this
case, the plaintiff claimed ownership of an apartment building in Tehran
that a bank expropriated through the approval and participation of the
Iranian government.234 The tribunal questioned the specific role certain
governmental agents played in the taking of the building, but it ultimately
held:
Where the alleged expropriation is carried out by way of a series of
interferences in the enjoyment of the property, the breach forming the
cause of action is deemed to take place on the day when the interference
has ripened into more or less irreversible deprivation of the property
rather than on the beginning date of the events.235

225. See id. ¶¶ 62–67.
226. See id. ¶ 72.
227. See id. ¶¶ 180–81.
228. See id. ¶ 181.
229. Id.
230. G.A. Res. 56/83, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-56-83.pdf.
231. Id. art. 15(1).
232. Id. art. 15(2).
233. 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206 (1985).
234. See id. at 230.
235. See id. at 240–41.
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The tribunal in Tippets v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran236
had a similar holding. This case concerned another Iranian joint venture
where the U.S. engineering company Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton
(TAMS) partnered with Aziz Farmanfarmaian and Associates (AFFA) to
form TAMS-AFFA that would perform architectural and engineering
services on the Tehran International Airport in August 1975.237 Work
stopped in early 1979 because of the Iranian Revolution.238 In July 1979,
the Iranian government appointed a temporary manager to TAMSAFFA.239 TAMS made several attempts in January and February 1980 to
correspond with TAMS-AFFA about continuing work on the airport but
never received a response.240 Additionally, TAMS-AFFA ceased all
communications with TAMS by December 1979, including announcing the
venture’s finances.241 Despite the appointment of temporary managers in
July of 1979, the tribunal determined that the series of events did not result
in an expropriation until March 1, 1980.242 Unlike the first several cases,
these decisions determined that the moment of expropriation is more
appropriate near the end of the series of acts.
As these cases show, because the prevailing standard is to decipher a
specific moment of expropriation to serve as the time of valuation, tribunals
have found themselves handcuffed with attempting to choose a moment of
expropriation that is not readily discernible.243 Not only has this problem
led to inconsistent decisions, but it is also still unclear how future tribunals
should decide the point in time at which to value the expropriated asset.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is not a large debate over the
temporal issue that these cases portray. In fact, the Reisman and Sloane
article discussed above is the only major article attempting to address this
problem.244 This may indicate either that tribunals are not concerned with
this issue, or that an alternative method to determine when to value an
expropriated asset does not seem as efficient. Vance R. Koven implied that
there might not be a better alternative when he wrote that “[f]or ‘creeping’
expropriation . . . determining the date on which ‘an action’ created that
result is an absurd exercise, but one of extreme importance because of the
principles of compensation at work in the Contract.”245
B. Difficulties in Applying the Many Methods of Valuation
This section considers the second difficulty in attempting to provide “just
compensation.” Tribunals have used numerous different valuation formulas
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219 (1984).
See id. at 220.
See id. at 224.
See id.
See id. at 225.
See id.
See id. at 225–26.
See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 143.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
Koven, supra note 212, at 277.
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when calculating fair market value, and this fact has contributed to the
problem of inconsistent adjudicatory awards. It first discusses the various
valuation methods that tribunals consider acceptable to use and then
examines how application of these different methods to creeping
expropriations has created inconsistent outcomes.
1. Acceptable Valuation Methods
The only thing that may be more important than the point in time at
which to value an asset is the valuation method used. While BITs,
international law, and the Restatement generally state that fair market value
is the appropriate means for determining “just compensation,” all are
essentially silent as to the valuation method that should be used to
determine fair market value.246 In general, tribunals see fair market value
as the price at which the investment would change hands in an open and
unrestricted market between a willing buyer and seller, absent compulsion,
and with the parties having reasonable knowledge of the facts.247 This
basic premise, though, does not explain what tools to use in deciding the
price a hypothetical buyer and seller should reach.248 Case law has shown
that, depending on the facts, courts and tribunals may use one of several
different valuation methods to provide fair market value.249
There are a few preferred choices for asset valuation. The first valuation
method used in determining fair market value is examining existing markets
for the asset under consideration.250 Unfortunately, there is not a readily
liquid market for many types of foreign investments.251 In Amoco, for
example, the tribunal commented that determining what a willing buyer and
seller would pay when the market does not actually exist makes the concept
of determining “fair market value” ambiguous.252 The tribunal went on to
state that in such instances they must utilize alternative methods of
valuation, even if they cannot reach a legitimate market value.253
Several such alternative valuation methods exist. The most popular
method is Discount Cash Flow (DCF) analysis.254 This form of analysis
uses historical profitability to predict future cash flows and then discounts
these flows back to present value.255 Some tribunals choose instead to use
246. See Choharis, supra note 109, at 41–42; see also RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note
102, at 183 (“Investment treaties use the term ‘fair market value’ (FMV) without defining
it.”).
247. See INA Corp. v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 380 (1985).
248. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 185.
249. See, e.g., James W. Weller, Note, International Parties, Breach of Contract, and the
Recovery of Future Profits, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 327 (1987).
250. See Abdala & Spiller, supra note 9, at 454.
251. Id. at 454–55.
252. See Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, ¶ 219 (1987).
253. See id. ¶ 220.
254. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 9.28; Heilbron, supra note 117, at 468–69.
255. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 116 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D.D.C.
2000), aff’d in part sub nom. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d
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the Direct Capitalization method, which is similar to DCF analysis but
relies less on income projections several years into the future and other
speculative elements.256 A third method examines “comparable” firms as a
proxy to value the expropriated asset.257 Each of these methods, however,
requires the asset to have a “going concern value,” which generally refers to
the principle that a willing buyer would pay a premium for the asset under
the belief that the asset has future profitability.258
If the investment is not a going concern, or there is not enough historical
information to properly project future cash flows,259 then tribunals cannot
properly utilize these main valuation options (hereinafter referred to as “top
tier methods”) and will look to alternative valuation methods.260 This other
group of methods includes using (1) the “book value,” or net value if one
was to sell only the bare physical assets, (2) the “replacement value,” or the
amount needed to undertake a similar venture at this point in time, (3) the
“liquidation value” or amount a party would receive if all of the assets were
liquidated less any outstanding liabilities that the enterprise has, and (4) the
amount of capital actually invested prior to expropriation (hereinafter
referred to as “second tier methods”).261
2. Difficulties in Applying These Methods to Creeping Expropriation
Arbitral tribunals have considered and utilized all of the above valuation
methods in cases of expropriation and they currently serve as the range of
acceptable methods under international law. Yet, using these numerous
techniques leads to conflicting results.262 For example, one author stated
that tribunals almost invariably use a method that treats the asset as a going
concern,263 where a premium is placed over the asset’s book value (a
1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated in part, 320 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Abdala & Spiller,
supra note 9, at 457–58.
256. See McKesson Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d at 22; see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note
18, ¶ 9.51. In McKesson, the tribunal chose to apply the DCAP method as opposed to DCF
given the circumstances of the case. See McKesson Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
257. See Abdala & Spiller, supra note 9, at 458–59.
258. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 893 (2d Cir.
1981).
259. The imprecise means of determining future cash flows and lost profits has generated
much controversy, particularly because the sums involved with predicting lost profits can be
enormous. At times this has made tribunals reluctant to award lost profits. See MCLACHLAN
ET AL., supra note 18, ¶¶ 9.13–28.
260. See Heilbron, supra note 117, at 469; see also Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 119–22 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev.
168 (2001) (stating that the tribunal must use the actual investment to determine fair market
value because of an inability to determine going concern value); Chase Manhattan Bank,
658 F.2d at 893 (refusing to consider a bank branch as a going concern because of the
difficulty of predicting the premium value a buyer would pay considering the economic
instability of Cuba following its revolution).
261. See WORLD BANK, supra note 196, art. IV(6); Abdala & Spiller, supra note 9, at
453–59; Heilbron, supra note 117, at 459, 469; Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 139
(citing Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987)).
262. See infra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
263. See Heilbron, supra note 117, at 469.
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second tier valuation method) to account for lost future profits.264 Thomas
Merrill states that as a result, valuations using these methods, like DCF
analysis, will produce larger awards, which the foreign investor presumably
prefers.265 Likewise, second tier methods would produce lower awards,
which the host state presumably prefers.266
Merrill also argues that these methods do not translate well to
investments taken via a creeping expropriation.267 Valuation methods that
rely on variables such as going concern value, the worth of physical assets,
and declared tax value are tailored toward expropriations where the host
country takes full possession of the property.268 Merrill notes that when the
government does not take possession of property, but merely diminishes its
value through its actions, these factors are less important.269 As an
example, if the host country expropriates an asset such as a factory through
nationalization, the value of the equipment taken is vital to provide proper
compensation. Several of the valuation methods discussed above (DCF,
DCAP, book value, replacement value, liquidation value) consider the value
of this equipment. However, if the expropriation results merely from a
series of regulations that no longer allows the factory to operate, then the
investor is still in control of the equipment. The deprivation did not occur
through having the equipment taken away, but from no longer being able to
use the equipment productively. In this situation, it likely does not matter
that the valuation methods consider equipment value in the calculations.
Additionally, these valuation methods become more speculative when a
tribunal is dealing with a series of acts that caused the deprivation rather
than a singular direct taking. Joseph Stiglitz has argued that numerous
factors influence market value, so it is difficult to determine how much
diminution in value is attributable to the expropriatory acts and how much
is attributable to other factors.270 For example, suppose that the people of a
country are pushing for a green movement and advocate that consumers use
more environmentally safe products. Simultaneously, the government
passes a new tax on consumers who dispose of pollutants, and both of these
factors independently reduce the demand for toxic waste dumps. An
assessor valuing a toxic waste dump would be required to determine what
percentage of the loss in market value is a result of the tax and what
percentage is a result of the citizens’ grass roots movement. Not only is
trying to make this determination speculative but the valuation methods
discussed above are not equipped to even consider such a problem.271

264. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d at 893.
265. See Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 110, 114 (2002).
266. See id.
267. See id. at 110, 115.
268. See id. at 115.
269. See id.
270. See Stiglitz, supra note 54, at 533.
271. See id. for a simpler example upon which this one was based.

2012]

BUT IS IT JUST?

1005

This becomes even more complex if one must consider whether a decline
in value was a derivative result of a regulatory act. For example, assume
that there was no green movement or tax on disposing of pollutants, but
rather a tax on consumers purchasing goods that produce toxic waste. If
there was a decrease in demand for toxic waste dumps the assessor must
determine to what degree it was caused by consumers purchasing less toxic
waste producing goods as a result of the tax, a change in consumer
preference to goods that do not produce toxic waste for other reasons, or a
change in consumer preference to use alternative waste dumping methods.
This shows how the decline in demand for toxic waste dumps could have
resulted from several other factors besides the government’s regulatory act
on consumers and how the process of attributing cause can be complex and
difficult.
As Part II explained, international law’s current doctrine for determining
“just compensation” for expropriation under BITs is not well suited to the
more narrow area of creeping expropriation. Tribunals analyzing BITs and
international law have developed a specific standard for determining the
valuation date and a series of acceptable valuation methods, but these both
are tailored towards compensating direct expropriations.
This is
understandable given the much older history of direct expropriation,272 but
a framework that now creates unpredictable results for the most common
form of expropriation undermines the primary purpose of having BITs.273
Part III provides some alternative methodologies that may be more
applicable to indirect (and in particular creeping) expropriations.
III. ALTERNATIVE TEMPORAL AND VALUATION METHODS SPECIFICALLY
FOR CREEPING EXPROPRIATIONS
This part discusses several suggestions proposed by scholars that would
increase consistency amongst adjudications of indirect expropriations. Part
III.A proposes alternative strategies to address the temporal issue and why
these strategies might reduce the inconsistencies that the current doctrine
produces. Part III.B then suggests alternative valuation methods that
attempt to deal with the problems that current valuation strategies create.
A. Alternatives to Selecting a “Moment of Expropriation”
International law and most BITs establish that tribunals should valuate
expropriated assets at the “moment of expropriation.”274 This is a
straightforward method for direct expropriations; however, as explained
above, this method becomes complicated when there is no clearly
demarcated moment.275 Although several scholars recognize the concerns

272.
273.
274.
275.

See Merrill, supra note 265, at 110.
See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 144.
See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200–45 and accompanying text.
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over the current “moment of expropriation” ideology,276 there are few
suggestions for alternative methods.277
Reisman and Sloane make the most well-known suggestion. They
propose that in situations of creeping expropriation the valuation date
should be separated from the expropriation date.278 Separating the two
moments would distinguish the question of liability from the question of
damages and work in preventing either party from attaining some sort of
windfall.279 These authors suggest that rather than having a bright line for
the exact moment of valuation, the tribunal should choose any date within
the series of events that would provide a fair market value sufficient to
make the investor whole.280 Irmgard Marboe also offers an alternative
method, which is a tweaked interpretation of Reisman and Sloane’s
suggestion.281 Under her interpretation, the moment of expropriation
should be the end of the series of acts while the moment of valuation should
be at the beginning.282
B. Alternative Valuation Methods
While arbitral tribunals and international courts have utilized numerous
different valuation methods depending on the facts of the case,283 each
method is more applicable to valuing an asset that the host country has
completely and directly taken from the investor.284 In efforts to address
creeping expropriation, methods that are analogous to, but slightly different
from, the current standards have been proposed.
Thomas Merrill suggests adapting two methods that U.S. case law has
adopted to address partial regulatory takings.285 Since creeping and indirect
expropriations do not actually take physical possession of the assets there is
essentially only a partial deprivation.286 The acts only deprive the investor
of the opportunity to benefit from the investment.287 Merrill states that this
is analogous to regulatory takings, which is a subcategory of eminent
domain under U.S. constitutional law.288 Given that fact, tribunals can
apply current U.S. jurisprudence for regulatory takings to cases of creeping
expropriation.289

276. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19; see also MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.278–
.287; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 245–48.
277. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
278. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 19, at 148.
279. See id. at 150.
280. See id.
281. See MARBOE, supra note 16, ¶ 3.284.
282. See id.
283. See supra notes 246–61 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 264–72 and accompanying text.
285. See Merrill, supra note 265, at 120–28.
286. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
288. See Merrill, supra note 265, at 120–21.
289. See id. at 121.
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Merrill’s first suggested method is the U.S. partial takings model.290
This method takes a snapshot of the fair market value of the property (under
the book value method)291 prior to the regulatory actions, then takes a
second snapshot after the acts, and awards the difference in value.292 Such
a procedure shifts the focus of the valuation process from determining what
the host government physically took—which the valuation methods are
generally more suited for293—to what the investor has lost. Rather than
providing the investor with the fair market value of the asset, he is only
receiving the value that he lost as a result of the host country’s actions.294
Merrill’s second suggestion is based off the Public Utility Model.295
This model is similar to the DCF method; however, it requires two separate
calculations of the going concern value (the expected market return).296
The going concern value is first calculated for the investment after the
various governmental acts.297 A second going concern calculation is then
done for a hypothetical firm in a competitive market with the same level of
risk and absent the governmental actions.298 The award granted is then the
difference between these two values.299 Utilizing this method would
ideally make the investor as whole as she would have been if acting in a
competitive market where the expropriatory acts never occurred.300
IV. THE NEED FOR NEW METHODS TO DETERMINE “JUST COMPENSATION”
AND THE SUITABILITY OF SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES
The final part of this Note argues that a change to current practices is
needed, and it considers whether the suggested alternatives can effectively
help make this change. Part IV.A discusses why different methodologies
are necessary to better provide “just compensation” for creeping
expropriations. Part IV.B considers the benefits and drawbacks of
implementing the alternative methods discussed in Part III for addressing
the temporal issue, suggests possible tweaks to the proposed methods, and
introduces a new solution using multiple “moments of expropriation.” Part
IV.C then discusses the suggested alternative valuation methods from Part
III and argues for either their use or the use of regression analysis for
valuation purposes.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See id.
See id. at 126.
See id. at 122–24.
See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
See Merrill, supra note 265, at 122.
See id. at 124.
See id. at 126.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 127.
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A. The Current Standards for Determining “Just Compensation” for
Creeping Expropriations Need To Be Altered
The inconsistencies resulting from using current international legal
standards in cases of creeping expropriation have undermined the primary
purpose of BITs.301 BITs are implemented as an attempt to induce
additional FDI in the signatory countries,302 which they arguably do by
offering several protections including the promise of “just compensation”
when a host country expropriates an asset.303 Unfortunately, under the
current international legal standards, there is no clear guidance to help
tribunals determine when an expropriated asset should be valued.304
Moreover, tribunals can freely choose between a multitude of valuation
formulas, each of which alters the amount of compensation awarded.305
Because of these ambiguities, foreign investors will likely be less confident
that BITs will actually provide the protections they claim to.
Reduced confidence in BITs has the consequential effect of diminishing
the level of FDI a host country would otherwise receive. These problems
arise from the fact that creeping expropriations deprive investors of their
asset in a completely different manner than direct expropriations do,306 yet
adjudicatory bodies still attempt to provide compensation using the same
methods in both situations. Implementing alternative standards aimed to
specifically address the way creeping expropriations affect investments
should address the problem. If they can diminish the inconsistencies across
tribunal decisions then the result should be increased FDI in the countries
that signed the BIT.
Moreover, it should not be difficult to begin implementing alternative
methods given the lack of binding precedent in this field.307 The vast
majority of BIT adjudications take place through arbitration, which does not
have the doctrine of stare decisis binding future tribunals to the
methodologies of past ones.308 Additionally, there is minimal published
case law discussing the methods to determine “just compensation” in cases
of creeping expropriation. A lack of extensive historical support for the
current international standards may mean that the international community
would be more open to adopting newer methodologies, particularly if they
result in awards that are more consistent across tribunals. Assuming that
the international legal community would be receptive to implementing
alternative methods, one must select an alternative that addresses the timing
and calculation problems.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 185–245 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 246–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74–89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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B. The Suitability of the Proposed “Moment of Expropriation” Alternatives
The few proposed alternatives to the current “moment of expropriation”
standard involve separating the valuation and expropriation date.309 The
strongest suggestion is Reisman and Sloane’s proposition that upon finding
that a creeping expropriation has occurred, the tribunal should choose any
date over the course of events that best provides a fair market value.310
This standard offers several benefits. First, this method eliminates the rule
of linking the moment of valuation with the moment of expropriation—a
rigid rule that is clearly applicable to direct expropriations, but creates
unavoidable complications for indirect ones. Second, eliminating the
requirement to choose a specific moment of expropriation allows the
tribunal to consider the appropriate valuation date on a case-by-case basis
while avoiding the risk of one party receiving some sort of unearned
benefit.311 Reisman and Sloane’s method also seems more appropriate than
Marboe’s interpretation, which places the moment of expropriation at the
end of the series of acts and the moment of valuation at the beginning.312
Under Reisman and Sloane’s method, the moment of expropriation would
merely serve as a conclusion that an expropriation took place, while the
moment of valuation serves as the pertinent date. However, making the
valuation date always at the first act exacerbates the central problem of one
party receiving an undeserved windfall.313
The major drawback to Reisman and Sloane’s method, however, is the
concern that valuation inconsistencies will persist because each tribunal can
arbitrarily choose a specific valuation date. This new method may provide
more possible days upon which the valuation can occur than the current
method, but it still ultimately allows the tribunal to select a valuation
moment either too early or too late in the expropriation process.
An alternative solution to the moment of expropriation problem could be
utilizing a series of valuations at numerous dates as opposed to one specific
date. The asset could be valued several times during the series of
expropriatory events, either at proportionate intervals, or at the beginning
and end of each act up until the expropriation claim is made or the series of
acts is over. The result would be a series of valuations that show how the
regulatory acts creating the expropriation diminished the asset’s value over
time. The tribunal could then consider these different valuations and reach
a middle ground, perhaps by averaging the valuations or using some other
formula that the tribunal thinks will produce a just outcome.
The major drawback to this solution is the heavy resources likely
required. Doing a proper valuation, no matter the method used, requires
time and money. Consequently, trying to do multiple valuations multiplies
the cost and time needed.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202–06 and accompanying text.
See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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However, this approach could rectify the issues that the current standard
creates.314 Attempting to choose a particular moment of expropriation in
cases of creeping expropriation seems illogical given that none of the acts
alone amount to a taking of property.315 Rather, the problem with creeping
expropriation is that an investor loses the ability to profit off her asset over
time.316 This timing approach attempts to account for this fact. In cases of
creeping expropriation, the investor is still able to gain from the investment
to some degree during the expropriatory process, and likewise the
government is not depriving the investor of her entire asset throughout the
process.317 Compensating at a level considered a “middle ground” for this
partial deprivation works towards eliminating any potential windfalls to
either side and accounts for the fact that throughout the expropriation
process the host country did not completely inhibit the investor from
benefiting off the investment.
C. The Suitability of the Proposed Valuation Method Alternatives
In regards to methods of valuing an expropriated asset, Merrill offered
two alternatives when creeping expropriation is involved.318 His first
suggestion was based off the U.S. partial takings model, where there are
two snapshots taken of the assets value, with the difference being awarded
This method is better suited for creeping
as compensation.319
expropriations than the current methods because it shifts the focus from the
overall value of the asset to the value the investor lost.320 The unique
aspect of creeping expropriations is that the investor still maintains physical
possession of the investment.321 Rather than losing the physical value of
the asset, it is the inability to use the investment—in other words a loss of
benefit—that harms the investor.322 While the current valuation methods
focus on physical value, the partial takings method focuses on lost value.323
Additionally, this method may also address the temporal problem because it
considers to what degree the acts deprived the investor of his investment
over time instead of at one point in time. The major drawback to this
method, though, is its reliance upon determining the book value at two
different times.324 Implementing this method therefore means that the
valuation would not account for any potential lost profits or for a lost
opportunity, two components that usually produce larger awards.325
314.
315.
316.
317.
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320.
321.
322.
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See supra notes 253–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85, 200–01 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 290, 295 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text.
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Merrill’s other suggested method is a variation of the U.S. Public Utility
Model, where the going concern value is determined for the investment as
well as a hypothetical investment in a competitive market and absent the
expropriatory actions.326 Using this method will allow a tribunal to
examine the direct impact each action causing the expropriation had on the
investment, helping to address the speculation concern that the diminution
in value resulted from some other act besides the governmental ones.327
This method may also better consider the loss in opportunity that a creeping
expropriation causes but that traditional valuation methods do not take into
account.328 On the other hand, some tribunals may find having to make
these calculations with a hypothetical firm too speculative. Moreover,
determining a value for a hypothetical investment in a competitive market
may undervalue the investor’s loss if the investment existed in a
noncompetitive market or if the investor possessed market power.
A third alternative may be to utilize regression analysis to determine how
much loss is attributable to each act by the host country. Conducting
several regressions where each holds all but one variable constant could
achieve this end. This type of analysis would allow the tribunal to
determine the effect that each act of the creeping expropriation had on
diminishing the asset’s value, and therefore help to eliminate the
speculation concern without relying on a hypothetical firm as the Public
Utility Method necessitates.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the problem of economic scarcity and attempting to
maximize the use of the world’s limited resources is a central task as
globalization continues.
One popular means to increase economic
efficiency is promoting FDI that can bring new tools into a productively
inefficient area. A major tool that countries use to induce this investment is
bilateral investment treaties, partly because of the expropriation protections
they provide. These provisions protect an investor from having their asset
unwillingly taken away from them, both directly and indirectly, without
“just compensation.” This Note has shown, however, that judicial attempts
to provide “just compensation” in the context of creeping expropriations
have produced inconsistent results.
Current adjudicatory standards for determining when and how to value
an expropriated asset partly cause this inconsistency because they are
designed for direct expropriations rather than indirect ones. The current
standard of choosing a specific “moment of expropriation” is not easily
discernible for creeping expropriations and can lead to a windfall for one of
the parties. Likewise, the various methods of valuation that tribunals use

326. See supra notes 295–99 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.

1012

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

are best suited for expropriations where the host country has actually taken
the asset, not where the harm is a loss of opportunity.
This Note has explored and proposed alternative methods geared towards
creeping expropriation. These approaches may lead to more consistent
determinations of what amounts to “just compensation” for cases of
creeping expropriation. Suggested methods include separating the moment
of expropriation from the valuation date or determining compensation from
multiple valuation dates, and using refashioned valuation methods to better
account for a loss of future opportunities even though physical possession
of the asset persists. By improving consistency across compensatory
awards for creeping expropriations, tribunals can improve the benefit that
BITs provide foreign investors and host countries. This result will
ultimately increase confidence in investing abroad, which further promotes
FDI and helps to alleviate the ongoing problem of economic scarcity.

